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Resúmen  
 
Este texto trata acerca del rol que tienen las agencias calificadoras de riesgos, 
específicamente la más antigua Standard and Poor’s, en la cantidad de préstamos que aprueba el 
Banco Central Europeo (ECB), a Grecia, en tiempos de crisis. La crisis económica que se vive 
actualmente a nivel mundial, especialmente en Grecia, ha tenido un gran impacto en el cambio 
del rol que juega S&P en las decisiones que toma respecto a este país. Es decir, a pesar de que ha 
sido uno de los peores deudores del ECB y que actualmente tiene una calificación bastante baja 
por parte de S&P, continua siendo uno de los, sino el más grande, acreedor de préstamos. 
Adicionalmente, el ECB ha adquirido bonos soberanos del gobierno griego, aun cuando esto va 
en contra de su política interna. Estos no son hecho aislados, el nivel de integración y el hecho de 
que exista la Unión Europea al igual que la Unión Monetaria Europea, tiene una gran influencia 
la manera en la que se ha llevado a cabo la política monetaria por parte del Banco Central 
Europeo. Cuál es la influencia, si es que existe, de la calificación de deuda soberana de Grecia 
por parte de S&P en las decisiones que adquiere el Banco Central Europeo con respecto a la 
cantidad de bonos que otorga a dicho país, en épocas de crisis en la zona de la Unión Europea?  
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Abstract  
 
What is the influence, if any, of the Greek sovereign debt rating by S&P, on the decision 
making of the ECB with respect to the loans issued in that country, in times of economic crisis?  
This paper analyses the evolution of the influence of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) on the decision 
making of the European Central Bank (ECB) before and after the economic crisis within the 
Eurozone. It provides a different perspective of how S&P as well as the ECB are seen today in 
the international arena. Furthermore, it contains empirical evidence that supports the idea that 
there is no apparent relation between the sovereign debt rate and the loan granting and bonds 
purchasing of the European Central Bank to Greece, when there is an economic crisis within the 
Eurozone. The presence or absence of an economic crisis within the Eurozone is not the only 
variable that affects the outcome of this theory; due to this, there is a description of the different 
autonomous variables, like level of integration, Greece’s GDP and Per Capita GDP, amongst 
others. This allows the reader to have a deeper understanding about the different areas involved 
in the model.  
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Introduction  
 
What is the influence, if any, of the Greek sovereign debt rating by Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P), on the decision making of the European Central Bank (ECB) with respect to the loans 
issued in that country, in times of economic crisis?  Ever since the beginning of S&P, its 
influence on the financial world has been undeniable. Before the member states of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU)1 of the European region experienced an economic crisis, all of their 
representatives have constantly complained about the ratings that each state has received, the 
time in which they were published and the way they handle the information to which they have 
access. Although, with an economic crisis, the Eurozone member states have still complained 
about the reports of S&P, the real effects of S&P on the decision making of the ECB had 
changed after the economic crisis. Greece became a member of the EMU in 2001, two years after 
its creation. Although there are numerous requisites to become part of the EMU, for Greece it 
was easy to become a member state. The most surprising fact is that even though “Greece was 
the worst fiscal sinner, having never complied with the Maastricht criteria; it was a major 
beneficiary of EU structural funds and farm subsidies, amounting to several percent of its GDP 
every year” (Aslund, 2010). This practice of continuing to lend Greece large amounts of money 
still exists today, even when they continue to be the worst fiscal sinners. This casts doubt on the 
actual influence that the sovereign rating of S&P has on the decisions made by the ECB towards 
Greece when there is an economic crisis within the Eurozone. Despite all this, Greece continues 
to be one of the greatest beneficiaries of the ECB loans mainly because if other EMU member 
states, especially Germany and France, keep on pressuring for Greece to exit from the EMU, this 
would imply a great loss for the entire European Union.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The EMU has seventeen members, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, all of which depend on the 
monetary policy of the ECB. 
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“The most important type of transactions in the international economy – including trade, 
investment, and finance- all depend on the availability of money and credit” (Cohn, 2002). 
Greece could not have been able to increase their balance-of-payments deficit if it would not 
have been for the large amounts of credits that the ECB, together with other private banks, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), approved for Greece. Although most of the 
responsibility relies on the Greek government due to the way they managed their funds, there is 
also shared responsibility because the ECB, as well as the other creditors, did not take enough 
time to evaluate the real economic position of Greece. Furthermore, the economic crisis of the 
United States also influenced, mainly the sub-prime crisis in the country, which also affected the 
European economy as a result of globalization. “Liberal interdependence theorists assert that this 
market increase on international financial transactions has resulted largely from advances in 
communications, technology, and transportation and that nation-states are therefore finding it 
increasingly difficult to regulate economic activities” (Cohn, 2002). Therefore, it might be due to 
an increase of technological advances that creditors have not taken the time to carefully evaluate 
Greece’s economy. An increase in Greece’s debt inevitably means that, sooner or later, Greek 
citizens have to pay, whether through taxes or through a radical decrease of government 
expenditure. Due to the wide complaints against S&P, is it only S&P’s fault that Greece fell into 
a billionaire balance of payments deficit? The globalized world in which we live today makes it 
impossible for the responsibility of a crisis to be blamed on a single actor, be it a state or non 
state actor. Since the world is interconnected, the consequences of bad decisions cannot be 
isolated in a single region, as in earlier times. Having an interrelated world has made it possible 
to develop new theories that help understand various facts and situations that are constantly 
taking place. One of the theories that were born under this concept in International Relations (IR) 
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is liberalism, deeply promoted by Andrew Moravcsik, which focuses on the inevitable influence 
of private groups in states’ foreign policy and general decisions. The theory proposed in this 
paper states that integration, as well as globalization, play a key role when the ECB takes any 
decision that involves Greece. Furthermore, I argue that in times of deep economic crisis, S&P 
ratings are less useful as a basis for decision making processes of supra-national lenders, 
especially in a context where failing to confer bailouts could mean the collapse of the EMU, as 
well as of the entire European Union.  
This paper consists in six parts. Part one is the introduction. In part two, literature 
revision, contains a background guide of S&P, how it works and what they do. This section also 
develops an explanation from the liberal perspective of the importance and the role of private 
groups in the foreign policies of states and/or institutions that represent these. Additionally, it 
contains general information about the ECB and its role in the Eurozone. To finish this section, 
there is a general description of the use of the term crisis and its relevance in the subject being 
discussed. The third part contains a thorough description of the theory proposed in this paper.  
Part four, data and methods, describes the variables and methods to be used in order to support 
the proposed theory. Part five explores the expected results based on the previous sections. 
Finally, part six contains the conclusions of this paper.   
 
Literature Revision 
Understanding Standard and Poor’s  
 There are different rating agencies in the financial world; one of the most important and a 
globally recognized agency is Standard and Poor’s (S&P). It was created in the 1830’s with the 
rise of private capital markets in the US, with the main objective of becoming an independent 
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third party group that provided essential financial information for investors in the US railroad 
industry, the main industry at the time. Today, S&P “strives to provide investors who want to 
make better informed investment decisions with market intelligence in the form of credit ratings, 
indices, investment research and risk evaluations and solutions” (“About Us,” 2012). One of its 
main jobs is to provide ratings of different financial divisions, which include corporations 
(industrial and of utilities), financial institutions, fund ratings, insurance, governments, and 
structured finance. “A credit rating is S&P opinion on the general creditworthiness of an obligor, 
or the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a particular debt security or other financial 
obligation. Over the years credit ratings have achieved wide investor acceptance as convenient 
tools for differentiating credit quality” (“Browse Ratings by Practice,” 2012). Within the 
government division, there is a sovereign rating which contains three different aspects: local 
currency rating; foreign currency rating; and, Transfer & Convertibility Assessment. Together, 
they build a big picture of the financial situation of each government so that investors can 
understand the risk of investing in a specific country. The “sovereign rating methodology 
addresses the factors that affect a sovereign government’s willingness and ability to service its 
debt on time and in full. The analysis focuses on a sovereign’s performance over past economic 
and political cycles, as well as factors that indicate greater or lesser fiscal and monetary 
flexibility over the course of future economic cycles” (“Sovereign government rating:,” 2011). 
The five key factors that form the foundation of the sovereign credit analysis are institutional 
effectiveness and political risk, economic structure and growth prospects, external liquidity and 
international investment position, fiscal performance and flexibility, and monetary flexibility 
(“Sovereign government rating:,” 2011). The ratings are based on letters; each meaning of the 
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credit rating is summarized in the table below, obtained from the S&P Credit Rating Definitions 
& FAQs:   
Table 1: Sovereign debt rate definitions 
'AAA' Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments. 
Highest Rating. 
'AA' Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments. 
'A' Strong capacity to meet financial commitments but somewhat 
susceptible to adverse economic conditions and changes in  
circumstances. 
'BBB' Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments, but more 
subject to adverse economic conditions. 
Investment 
Grade 
'BBB-
' 
Considered lowest investment grade by market participants. 
'BB+' Considered highest speculative grade by market participants. 
'BB' Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing 
uncertainties to adverse business, financial and economic 
conditions. 
'B' More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic 
conditions but currently has the capacity to meet financial 
commitments. 
'CCC' Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable business, 
financial and economic conditions to meet financial 
commitments. 
'CC' Currently highly vulnerable. 
'C' A bankruptcy petition has been filed or similar action taken, but 
payments of financial commitments are continued. 
Speculative 
Grade 
'D' Payment default on financial commitments. 
Note: Ratings from 'AA' to 'CCC' may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or 
minus (-) sign to show relative standing within the major rating categories. 
Ratings Outlook 
A Standard & Poor's rating outlook assesses the potential direction of a long-term credit 
rating over the intermediate term (typically six months to two years). In determining 
a rating outlook, consideration is given to any changes in the economic and/or 
fundamental business conditions. An outlook is not necessarily a precursor of a rating 
change or future CreditWatch action. 
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• Positive means that a rating may be raised. 
• Negative means that a rating may be lowered. 
• Stable means that a rating is not likely to change. 
• Developing means a rating may be raised or lowered. 
• N.M. means not meaningful. 
CreditWatch 
CreditWatch highlights our opinion regarding the potential direction of a rating. 
 
• Positive means that a rating may be raised. 
• Negative means that a rating may be lowered. 
• Developing means that a rating may be raised, lowered or affirmed. 
CreditWatch is not intended to include all ratings under review, and rating changes may 
occur without the ratings having first appeared on CreditWatch. 
 
An additional rating not included in the chart above is SD- Standard Default: 
SD and D - An obligor rated 'SD' (Selective Default) or 'D' has failed to pay one or more 
of its financial obligations (rated or unrated) when it became due. A 'D' rating is assigned 
when Standard & Poor's believes that the default will be a general default and that the 
obligor will fail to pay all or substantially all of its obligations as they become due. An 
'SD' rating is assigned when Standard & Poor's believes that the obligor has selectively 
defaulted on a specific issue or class of obligations but it will continue to meet its 
payment obligations on other issues or classes of obligations in a timely manner. Please 
see Standard & Poor's issue credit ratings for a more detailed description of the effects of 
a default on specific issues or classes of obligations (“Standard and Poor’s Definitions,” 
2010).  
In order to warn a possible rating change or to notify of an actual change, S&P posts it in 
the S&P Credit Watch List. Companies are added to the list when S&P believes “a rating change 
is likely, with additions designated as ‘indicated upgrades’ or ‘indicated downgrades’, or 
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‘developing’ if a rating change of unknown direction is likely. As a result, a rating change 
announcement may occur after a firm’s debt is placed on Credit Watch List, or it may occur 
without being preceded by a Credit Watch designation” (Halt, Holthausen & Leftwich, 1992).  
According to numerous authors, rating agencies like S&P play a key role and are one of 
the most influential actors when it comes to sovereign rates. Like Fabian Linder reveals in his 
article, “Rating Agencies do not merely express their private opinion in the same way as the 
newspaper commentators. Their opinion automatically has consequences for the predicted event. 
Insurers, pension funds and banks are obliged by law to sell their bonds if their rating is no 
longer high enough. This can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy: the rise in interest rates caused by 
the sale of bonds increases the likelihood of a nation going bankrupt” (2012). In other words, due 
to the close relation between sovereign and bond rating, the ratings provided by S&P and their 
timing do influence the market, especially when it comes to sovereign rates as it can lead a 
country to bankruptcy due to a decrease in the interest rate, in the demand, and an increase of the 
supply sovereign bonds increases, making these less attractive to the public and generating 
economic problems inside the country due to the negative effect of the bond’s price.  
As much as the sovereign rating methodology appears to be very specific and to include 
all areas related to the financing area, the ratings of S&P have been highly criticized within the 
Eurozone, especially after the crisis started, due to the mentioned effects of a change in 
sovereign rating. Representatives of the European countries, and even more commonly Europe’s 
central bankers, have publicly demonstrated their discomfort. “Christian Noyer, president of the 
Banque de France, accused the rating agency of giving more weight to political than economic 
factor, and ‘once again’ getting its timing wrong” (Peel, 2011). Furthermore, according to 
Linder, “Rating agencies are partly to blame for the aggravation of the Euro crisis. So far, 
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politicians have done little to stop agencies from adding fuel to the fire of the Euro crisis” 
(Linder, 2012). Critics also rise because, as Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich state in their text, the 
effects on the price of a bond and on sovereign debt are higher with a downgrade than with an 
upgrade (1992). “According to a new study by the ECB, Greece’s downgrade not only led to a 
worsening of the financial situation in Greece, but also to the crisis spreading to other Eurozone 
countries”  (Linder, 2012).   
The influence of private groups in the international arena 
 In IR, each theory has a different approach regarding its main actors. For 
liberalism the main actors of world politics are the society and interest groups. As Moravcsik 
states, “liberal theory rests on a ‘bottom-up’ view of politics in which the demands of individuals 
and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics” (Moravcsik, 1997). On the other 
hand, it is important to consider that foreign policy has a great impact not only inside a state, but 
also within the neighboring countries; that is, the region in which it is located and the rest of the 
states that maintain a relation with the state. The globalized world in which world politics 
develops today has become more interdependent than two or three decades before. This means 
that the decisions made today have a greater impact on other states. This situation becomes more 
evident in an integrated region like the EMU since the use of a common currency and the fact 
that member states depend on the ECB for monetary policy, means that a decision for one 
country immediately affects the other member states. This is why, as proposed in this paper, the 
regional integration of the EMU does influence the decisions taken by the ECB towards Greece. 
As a result, unity and cooperation among states make every state stronger than if it would act 
alone (Doyle, 1995). These are the main premises that help understand the way in which state 
preferences influence the external behavior of states in an interdependent world: societal actors 
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are the main actors and the interdependent world influences their preferences and, therefore, the 
states external behavior.  
State preferences “comprise a set of fundamental interests defined across ‘states of the 
world’” and are “independent of the strategies of other actors” as well as “prior to specific 
interstate political interactions” (Moravcsik, 1997). In other words, the preferences of the inside 
state actors and how they, depending on their social, political and economic position, influence 
the decision makers regarding foreign policy. “State priorities and policies are determined by 
politicians at the head of the national government, who are embedded in domestic and 
transnational civil society, which decisively constrains their identities and purposes” (Moravcsik, 
1993). This is possible because liberalism places a great importance on the freedom of the 
individual. Freedom can be negative, which includes freedom of conscience, press, speech, 
property, among others; positive, which includes social and economic rights; or democratic, 
meaning democratic representation and participation (Doyle, 1995). It is also important to 
consider that “the identity, interests, and influence of groups vary across time, place and, 
especially, issue-area, according to the net expected costs and benefits of potential foreign 
policies” (Moravcsik, 1993). This perspective is also supported by Finnemore, who establishes in 
her text, that a complete analysis of the influence of individuals needs to include the cultural 
environment in which individuals are located, since this would help determine what they fight 
for and what they do not. “Europe, historically the most divided and war torn of continents, is at 
one and the same time uniting and pacifying as a whole (at the international level) and dissolving 
and destroying in some parts (at the domestic level)” (Doyle, 1995). In this sense, due to high 
importance of integrity and the role that this element plays in the EU, most of the decisions that 
member states support seek to prevail, above everything else, the integration of the EU.  
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Liberalism considers context as a basic aspect of politics. The main importance of 
considering context is that while realism as well as other theories only focuses on states 
behavior, facts show that individuals are the ones who have a great influence on state and private 
policies; therefore, the interests that lie beyond states do in fact matter. Due to this, the presence 
or absence of an economic crisis does influence the actions of states, like it is stated in the theory 
proposed in this paper. Societal and private actors can influence through different ways. The first 
one is by bargaining with the congress representatives, or its equivalent in each country. The 
second one is by lobbying with influential strategic actors. In the case of the EU, this takes place 
when Greek private groups negotiate with representatives of Germany and France, the most 
influential states of the EU, so that they do not continue to promote the exit of Greece from the 
EMU because of their economic crisis. A third way is through public campaigns that, in the end, 
force decision makers to adopt a law in a determined matter do to the great influence of the 
campaigns. Finally, societal actors can be influential through non-governmental organizations 
that have a wider scope of action and can promote and pressure inside government actors to act 
one way or another. A clear example of this situation is when S&P publishes the sovereign debt 
ratings and governments and/or its representatives, such as the ECB, react to these by approving 
or not loans to a specific country. Still, this behavior remains constant only when there is not an 
economic crisis within the Eurozone. The beauty of the mentioned ways of how societal actors 
influence the external behavior of states is that the decisions adopted by member states, that is, 
their foreign policy, would not only have an effect inside the state but it would also reach other 
states within and outside the region in which they are located. In other words there is an 
interdependent policy, defined as “the set of costs and benefits created for foreign societies when 
dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences, that is, the pattern of 
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transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes” 
(Moravcsik, 1997). There are different ways in which societal actors influence the behavior of 
states and, due to the interdependent world of today, these decisions have a national, as well as 
international, impact. Andrew Moravcsik has helped understanding the importance of liberalism 
in today’s IR field. For this, he established three core assumptions, all based on “Liberal IR 
theory’s fundamental premise- that the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic 
and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behavior by 
influencing the social purposes underlying states preferences” (Moravcsik, 1997).  
The first core assumption states that “The fundamental actors in international politics are 
individuals and private groups, who are on average rational and risk-averse and who organize 
exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by 
material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence” (Moravcsik, 1997). 
This first premise can be confirmed through the influence that S&P sovereign debt rate has 
proven to have over the ECB decisions in times when there is no economic crisis. Liberalism 
focuses on the importance of the demands of individuals and society groups when defining 
foreign policy. It is due to the scarcity of goods and differentiation that actors are motivated to 
bargain in order to obtain as much benefits as possible (Moravcsik, 1997). In fact, this is the 
perspective under which Greece worked before its crisis, and it is why they entered into a crisis 
in first place. In other words, their high debts that seek to obtain as many benefits as possible 
caused an increase in the deficit of balance of payments. In general, liberalism theory “seeks to 
generalize about the social conditions under which the behavior of self interested actors 
converges toward cooperation or conflict” (Moravcsik, 1997). There are three main factors 
considered by liberalism that contribute to the development of a conflict. The first one refers to 
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divergent fundamental beliefs about the provision of public goods; the second one refers to 
conflict over scarce material goods (it motivates actors to assume cost and risk to obtain them); 
and, finally, social power, since some inequalities of societal influences can be greater in one 
society than in another (Moravcsik, 1997). Today, the member states of the EU, especially 
Germany and France, have cooperated often, rather than creating conflicts, because social 
implications that would derive from a separation of Greece would be greater than the ones they 
are currently paying as a result of granting elevated loans to highly indebted countries, like 
Greece. Moravcsik addresses the importance of considering the “increasing prominence of non 
state actors such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and 
international institutions, globalization has…raised the importance of the neoliberal paradigm” 
(Milner & Moravcsik, 2009).  
The second assumption states that “States (or other political institutions) represent some 
subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences 
and act purposively in world politics” (Moravcsik, 1997). According to the liberal theory, the 
state is a representative institution subject to capture and recapture, construct and reconstruct the 
coalitions of societal actors (Moravcsik, 1997). In other words, it acts as a transmission belt in 
which “preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy” 
(Moravcsik, 1997). This is evident in the case of the EMU since due to the interest of most 
individuals (less Germans and French since they are paying the highest costs of the Eurozone 
crisis) the ECB keeps on approving high loans for Greece in order to maintain the integration 
within the region. As it is natural, governments cannot represent all individuals but, which 
explains why there are some privileged actors depending on the government in charge. Still, 
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there are always some elements that keep constant through time, like maintaining the EMU in the 
case of the EU member states.  
The last assumption affirms that “The configuration of interdependent state preferences 
determines state behavior” (Moravcsik, 1997). There are 3 different scenarios for this 
assumption. The first one takes place when preferences are compatible, the cases in which 
incentives coexist with low conflict. The second one is the opposite, when state preferences are 
zero-sum and tension, as well as the possibility for conflict, increases. In this case, “the utility of 
threat…depends more on the intensity and the balance of the interests involve, as well as upon 
the ability to shift the blame for missing the ‘last clear chance’ before a dangerous escalation, 
than upon military capabilities” (Kratochwil, 1992). The last one is when there are mixed 
motives, the cases in which states have an incentive to negotiate policy coordination. In this case, 
it is also important to consider that “within each qualitative category, incentives vary further 
according to the intensity of preferences” (Moravcsik, 1997). Before the Eurozone crisis, states 
in this region were placed in the first scenario. Nonetheless, after they discovered the real 
economic situation of Greece and how it was (and would continue) affecting all the other 
member states, they shifted to the last scenario. Although Germany and France want Greece out 
of the EMU, there are mixed motives and preferences that have stopped these states from 
actually pursuing a real exit of Greece from the EMU.  
Today, the decisions and actions of states impact the ones made by the other states, and 
vice versa. The best example is the EU, were any decision of one state would influence the other 
member states. From where do these foreign policies of state arise? Here, the inevitable and 
significant influence of individuals and other non state actors like rating agencies arise. The first 
important fact to consider is that individuals are the ones who represent states; therefore, they are 
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the ones who decide foreign policy and implement it. Since they are humans, they are not perfect 
and can be influenced by pressures from different sides. Due to this, the influence of the non-
state actors increases. Inside each state there are various groups that pursue different interests. 
Due to the important role that specific interests play in individuals as well as multinational 
corporations, NGO’s and rating agencies, they each seek a channel to affect the decisions that 
regard their interests. “Domestic structures are likely to determine both the availability of 
channels for transnational actors into the political systems and the requirements for ‘winning 
coalitions’ to change policies… the more fragmented the state and the better organized civil 
society, the easier should be the access for transnational actors” (Risse-Kapen, 1995). The 
amount of influence that a determined private group or individual has would determine whether 
it would or would not influence the external behavior of states, like rating agencies in the case of 
the ECB. When there is not an economic crisis, the decisions of the ECB would be influenced by 
the sovereign debt rates from S&P. Nonetheless, the opposite would happen in the absence of an 
economic crisis within the Eurozone. An important variable that affects the interests of domestic 
societal groups is that due to technology, actors within different states are able to interconnect 
and be able to put more pressure inside states if, on another country, they are pursing the same 
objectives. Therefore, through the use of technology, rating agencies are able to publish their 
rates and reach more individuals and companies than before. This way, they have a greater 
impact on national preference formation, the configuration of state preferences, interstate 
negotiations and outcomes. “The most fundamental influences on foreign policy are, therefore, 
the identity of important societal groups, the nature of their interests, and their relative influence 
on domestic policy. Groups that stand to gain and loose a great deal per capita tend to be the 
most influential” (Moravcsik, 1993). 
15	  
	  
 The European Central Bank 
The European Central Bank came into being on 1 June 1998 and it became the “captain” 
of the Eurosystem team “– the central banking system of the euro area – (and it) has been 
conducting monetary policy for the countries in the currency union. The monetary policy 
“influences the economy through changes in the money supply” (Cohn, 2002). Its mission, “We 
at the European Central Bank are committed to performing all central bank tasks entrusted to us 
effectively. In so doing, we strive for the highest level of integrity, competence, efficiency and 
transparency”, reveals the importance of the ECB within the Eurozone (“The mission of,” 2012). 
Its primary objective is price stability over the medium term, because stable prices form the basis 
for sustainable economic growth and prosperity in Europe” (“The first ten years,” 2012). It also 
has the “sole power to authorize the issue of euro banknotes… Member States may issue coins 
but the ECB must first authorize the annual amount to be issued” (“Third Stage of,” 2011). 
Therefore, it has a monopoly of the money supply within the Member States of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU).  
The 17 members of the EMU depend on the ECB monetary policies in concordance with 
the National Central Banks of each Member State. National Central Banks are responsible for 
enacting the monetary policy across the Eurozone on behalf of the ECB, through liquidity 
provision (granting loans) and other tools (such as holding reserves from national banking 
sectors) (Ruparel & Persson 2011). Due to this economic dependence, Greece is not able to take 
any monetary policy as part of a plan to solve their crisis, only fiscal policy can be modified 
internally through interest rates and expenditure, all based on the Maastricht criteria or the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The fiscal policy “affects the economy through changes in 
government spending and/or taxes. Then a government uses fiscal policy to deal with a balance-
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of-payments- deficit, it lowers government expenditures and/or raises taxes to withdraw 
purchasing power from the public” (Cohn, 2011). In fact, the plan of recovery for Greece has a 
major focus on decreasing government expenditure, by decreasing the amount of social benefits 
in education, unemployed individuals, amongst other areas and taxation increase. In 2010, the 
first measure adopted in this matter by Greece was  “a rise in the top rate of value-added tax, 
from 19% to 21%, more increases in excise tax on fuel, tobacco and alcohol, a freeze on 
pensions and an unprecedented 30% cut in civil servants’ Christmas, Easter and summer 
bonuses” (“Now comes the pain,” 2010). In 2011 these types of fiscal policies continued to be 
modified with the main objective of decreasing the fiscal deficit gap. As a complement, the ECB 
has developed different economic adjustment programs. The Second Economic Adjustment 
Program for Greece proposed by the ECB and established in March 2012 seeks to put “Greece’s 
public debt ratio on a downward path below 117% of GDP by 2020. The program will be 
accompanied by strengthened monitoring of the implementation of reforms in Greece” (“Investor 
Presentation,” 2012).  Furthermore, the ECB has taken the two most important actions to help 
Greece: loan lending and purchase of sovereign bonds.  
Table 2: Holders of Greek Government Bonds 
and Debt, in billion EUR 
Greek	  banks	   56	  
Other	  European	  Banks	   50	  
ECB	  (direct	  holdings,	  nominal	  value)	   50	  
Central	  Bank	  of	  Greece	   10	  
Greek	  social	  securities/other	  government	   30	  
Other	  investors	   120	  
Total	  Government	  Bonds	   260	  
+	  EU/IMF	  loans	  already	  disbursed	   53	  
Total	  Debt	   310	  
 
Source: BIS 
Retrieved from: “Who owns Greek Debt” 
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According to the chart provided above, by 31 March 2011 the ECB owned 33.22% of the total 
Greek debt. Still, this relation has increased in the past year due to the increase of loans and 
purchase of Greek sovereign bonds2. Consequently, if a country defaults they will not be able to 
pay back all the money they owe creditors, amongst them the ECB; “despite this worrying 
exposure, the ECB continues to accept various assets as collateral from banks in return for giving 
these banks very cheap loans” (Ruparel & Persson 2011).   
 
Looking Back to the Crisis in the Eurozone  
According to the “Key Dates of the Financial Crisis” of the ECB, the crisis dates back to 
2005 when the “ECB warns that financial imbalances are growing and look likely to continue, 
mainly at global level, but also in the euro area”. Despite of the warning, the market did not take 
any preventive measures and kept with old financial end economic practices. The crisis in the 
United States did not have a reaction as profound as in other regions in Europe. None the less, it 
did set a precedent for the finance market to tumble. In October 2009, George Papandreou 
corrected the data of the economic situation of Greece and revealed that they had a budget deficit 
of 13.6% of GDP in 2009 and that its public debt was 115% of GDP (Aslund, 2010). “A first 
disclosure of the much larger budget deficit unleashed the crisis, and a second downward 
revision of the budget deficit in April 2010 eliminated all the market confidence” within the 
Eurozone (Aslund, 2010). Instead of acting immediately, the EMU governments delayed the 
crisis treatment from February to May 2010, when financial markets exploded “the actors were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  data	  for	  this	  period	  is	  not	  currently	  available.	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the Eurozone countries and the ECB rather than the European Union as a whole. Their policy 
line made little sense” (Aslund, 2010).  
 According to the Investopedia dictionary, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis can be 
defined as a “period of time in which several European countries faced the collapse of financial 
institutions, high government debt and rapidly rising bond yield spreads in government 
securities. The European sovereign debt crisis started in 2008, with the collapse of Iceland's 
banking system, and spread primarily to Greece, Ireland and Portugal during 2009. The debt 
crisis led to a crisis of confidence for European businesses and economies”. As a response to this 
crisis, the term PIIGS was born to refer to the Eurozone nations which were considered weaker 
economically following the financial crisis. It is composed by Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece 
and Spain (PIIGS, 2012).  The crisis in the Eurozone was somehow predictable if the finance and 
economic market would have responded accurately and on time.  
The president of the ECB in 1998, Wim Duisenberg, stated that, “There is no central 
bank in the world that is as independent from politics as the European Central Bank”, idea 
shared by all of the former and current ECB presidents (Ruparel & Persson, 2011). But, 
considering the recent actions of the ECB towards Greece and that there is an economic crisis 
within the Eurozone, can this thought be applied to today’s reality? 
 
Theory 
 There is an inevitable relation between the rating agencies and the loan lending and 
purchasing of sovereignty bonds to Greece, by the ECB. As it was previously mentioned, due to 
the important position in the finance world of S&P, its ratings are extremely influential when 
investors make a decision (but mostly in non-crisis times). Therefore, in the case of sovereign 
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rates, if S&P downgrades the rate of state, the major impact relies on the quantity of loan lending 
approved by the ECB and the demand, supply and interest rate of the bonds. Still, evidence and 
facts within the Eurozone reveal that this is not the only possible relation.  
The response of the ECB to the rating agencies is extremely different when there is an 
economic crisis within the Eurozone as well as a regional integration. The EU is united by more 
than their regional location, the establishment of the EMU made them change from cousins to 
brothers, meaning that their actions became a lot more interdependent and influential among 
Member States. It is because of this that the crisis in Greece had an impact in the EMU Member 
States, and even throughout the region. Due to the high integration of the EMU Member States, 
the ECB is responsible for their economic situation since it is the one in charge of the monetary 
policy as well as of watching that they are all following the parameters of the EMU. 
Consequently, the moment they found out the Greek crisis the ECB had (and still has) the 
obligation to respond and act to solve it. In this moment, the sovereign rate of Greece (or any 
other Member State facing a crisis) does not matter anymore. This can be evidenced in the chart 
below:    
Table 3: EMU Sovereign debt rates by S&P 
Country	   Rating	  (last	  of	  2012)	  
Portugal	   BB	  
Ireland	  	   BBB+	  
Italy	   BBB+	  
Greece	   SD	  
Spain	   A	  
Belgium	   AA	  
France	  	   AA+	  
Germany	   AAA	  
Netherlands	   AAA	  
Slovak	  Republic	   A	  
Slovenia	   A+	  
Source: S&P 
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The PIIGS, despite their rate downgrade are the ones who receive the highest financial support, 
especially Ireland and Portugal, through the purchase of bonds and/or loan granting, in the EMU, 
through the ECB. The opposite would happen if there would not be any economic crisis; the 
ECB would consider the sovereign rate before taking any decision.  
The change of attitude under the mentioned circumstances can also be evidenced through 
the ECB’s rule book which states that “overdrafts or any other type of credit facility with the 
ECB or with the national central banks in favor of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities other bodies governed by public 
law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly 
from them by the ECB or national central banks of debt instruments” (Ruparel & Persson, 2011). 
This reveals that the ECB, in theory, is prohibited to purchase sovereignty bonds and this, at the 
same time, assures political independence. Still, in practice, the ECB buys government bonds 
from Greece which supports the theory proposed in this paper because in times of economic 
crisis, the ECB makes “exceptions”- ignores the regulations- in order to maintain the political 
unity of the European Union. “The ECB’s political independence is a founding principle of the 
Single Currency – and was seen as absolutely essential in order to avoid the ECB ever being 
used as a tool for politicians to finance government deficits” (Ruparel & Persson, 2011). 
Furthermore, as it was previously mentioned, the ECB also gives very cheap loans to Greece so 
that this country can have liquidity to respond to their debts. For the EMU Member States and 
the ECB there is a greater cost in letting the region dissolve than in increasing the loan granted to 
Greece and the purchase of government bonds.  
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Figure 1: Greek government bond ownership by region 
Source: BIS 
         Retreived from: “Who owns Greek Debt?” 
 
The figure above shows, that most of the Greek debt is owned by the European region, 
represented mostly by the ECB. “Since June 2010, the ECB has purchased €77.5bn in 
government bonds through its Securities Markets Programme. Although information is scarce, it 
is widely believed that nearly all this money has been spent on debt peripheral Eurozone 
economies, mainly Greece, Ireland and Portugal” (Ruparel & Persson, 2011). Furthermore, “in 
2010 the ECB is estimated to have purchased almost all of the long term government debt 
available from Greece” which means that it “was able to stay afloat due to credit provided on the 
back of the extra demand created by the ECB” (Ruparel & Persson, 2011). Clearly, the influence 
of the sovereign ratings of S&P changes when there is economic crisis within the Eurozone as 
well as when there is integration among the Member States of the EMU. 
S&P is a world-wide recognized agency whose labor has impacted the financial system 
up to the point that bank policies, in specific cases, depend on the ratings of S&P. Although there 
are different divisions rated by S&P, for this paper we focus on the sovereign rates. Data from 
S&P establishes all the aspects related to the financial performance of a state that is considered 
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when ranking3. Still, it is extremely important to consider that analysts are humans; therefore, 
they tend to be influenced by an external environment when determining the rank that each state 
has in each section of the rate. This means that even though S&P has a specific function, to 
proved unbiased ratings, in the process of rating it is impossible not to have influence from the 
environment which is translated into manipulation of the information that S&P control. 
Considering that it is a private company, the privileged access to the information when rating a 
country gives them the power to decide when and how to influence the market. However, for this 
to take place two conditions need to be met. First, there cannot be an economic crisis within the 
zone. Second, there has to be no regional integration. Only then would the influence of the 
ratings of S&P have a direct impact in the quantity of loans granted to Greece and the purchase 
of its sovereign bonds.  
Based on this information, the two proposed hypothesis are: 
1. The lower the sovereign debt rate of Greece from Standard & Poor’s, the 
lower the amount of loans granted and of bonds purchased to Greece from the 
European Central Bank, when there is not an economic crisis within the 
Eurozone.  
2. There is no apparent relation between the sovereign debt rate and the loan 
granting and bonds purchasing of the European Central Bank to Greece, when 
there is an economic crisis within the Eurozone.  
In the next section we discuss the variables used to implement the proposed theory 
described above.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  5	  aspects	  that	  S&P	  considers	  for	  ratings	  are	  provided	  in	  the	  section	  of	  Literature	  Revision.	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Data and Methods 
 This theory contains three main variables. All the values are chosen from 2002 since 
Greece recently entered the EMU in 2001. This way, the data collected is more precise since they 
consider the Euro as the official currency and it gives a term of one year to stabilize the values 
included in this study.  
1. Dependent Variable: ECB loan granting and sovereign bond purchasing.  
The dependent variable is quantitative. The values of this variable are represented in the 
balance sheet of the Gross External Debt Position of the Bank of Greece. The values are annual. 
This allows comparing the bonds and notes, and loans, equally in all the periods. Even though 
the amount of money in the two divisions throughout 2012 is of great importance for this study, 
the values do not match the annual study used in this paper. It would not be possible to use 
quarter values since they are not available for all the years, not even for 2012.   
Table 4: Long-term External Debt Position (millions of €) 
	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	  
Bonds	  and	  
notes	   69745	   89334	   433,192	   508,614	   563,102	   629,700	   688,530	   787,406	   650,692	   418,879	  
Loans	   11218	   11164	   45,050	   48,020	   44,833	   44,263	   41,628	   56,657	   118,125	   278,622	  
Total	  	   80963	   100498	   478242	   556634	   607935	   673963	   730158	   844063	   768817	   697501	  
Source: Bank of Greece- Gross External Debt Position 
Based on the chart provided above, we obtain this figure: 
24	  
	  
 
This figure represents the percentage that each division of our study has in relation to the 
total external debt. Furthermore, it allows having a clear idea of the changes that the compounds 
of the external debt of Greece has experienced since 2002. Throughout time, there is a common 
trend of the Bank of Greece depending more on bonds and notes than on loans. None the less, 
from 2009 to 2010 the percentage of loans duplicated, and from 2010 to 2011 it almost tripled. 
Clearly, the loans that the ECB has increased considerably which reveals the change in policies 
from the ECB towards Greece in times of crisis. In general, in times of economic crisis in the 
Eurozone, regardless of the sovereign debt rate of S&P, the ECB would lend and buy 
sovereignty bonds as much as necessary.  
2. Independent Variable: Sovereign debt rate by S&P.  
The sovereign debt rate is the most important theoretical variable. It is rated based on the 
external as well as the internal environment; more specifically, it depends on the five areas of 
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analysis done by S&P4. Each rating belongs to December of each year. This way, an accurate 
comparison between the total external debt position of Greece at the end of the year and the S&P 
sovereign debt rate can be developed, as showed in the chart below: 
Table 5: Relation between Total External Debt Position and S&P Sovereign Rating 
Period	   Total	  External	  Debt	  Position	  (millions	  of	  €)	   S&P	  Rating	  	  
2002	   80963	   A	  
2003	   100498	   A+	  
2004	   478242	   A	  
2005	   556634	   A	  
2006	   607935	   A	  
2007	   673963	   A	  
2008	   730158	   A	  
2009	   844063	   BBB+	  
2010	   768817	   BBB-­‐	  
2011	   697501	   C	  
 
3. Antecedent Variable: economic crisis within the Eurozone.  
This variable is qualitative. It is a dummy variable, characterized because it can only take 
two values: 0 means the absence of an economic crisis within the Eurozone; and 1 means the 
existence of an economic crisis within the Eurozone. This type of variable allows us to evaluate 
the effect of an exogenous shock – economic crisis- to the model. According to the ECB, there 
was an economic crisis within the Eurozone since 2005 when the ECB warned financial 
imbalances. In 2007, the ECB detected an increase in market vulnerability of the financial 
system and there were liquidity shortages worldwide (“Key Dates,” 2012). 2008 was a key year 
because a lot of changes in the economic and financial aspects: the Lehman Brothers declared 
bankruptcy, banks - including the ECB- moved to cut rates, the G7 and the G20 met to discuss 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  five	  areas	  are	  mentioned	  in	  the	  second	  part:	  Understanding	  Standard	  and	  Poor’s.	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possibilities to protect the financial system, to mention some. Still, it was not until October 2009 
when the newly elected socialist government under George Papandreou that the fiscal crisis was 
revealed: Greece had a budget deficit of 13.6% of GDP in 2009 and its public debt was 115% of 
GDP. The ECB and EMU Member States took too long to react and so the Greek crisis 
exploded. The main issue relied in that the data revealed by the Bank of Greece was not real; 
therefore, it was almost impossible to be able to know the real situation behind their economic 
status. The ECB played a key role in the years before since it did not evaluate nor did it observe 
the Greek policies as close as it should have. “Greece was the worst fiscal sinner, having never 
complied with the Maastricht rules persistently and blatantly” (Aslund, 2010). In this year, the 
ECB also announced refinancing operations in the zone, but not specifically for Greece. From 
this moment on, the ECB entered in crisis and has started to work in order to prevent any of the 
PIIGS from leaving the EMU due to their economic condition.  
4. Control variables: There are numerous variables that can influence this model. 
a. Greece GDP- the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the final value of all the 
final goods and services produced in one year in a country (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 
2002). Its main components are private consumption, gross investment, government 
spending, exports and imports. From these components the most influential in the 
model is government spending. Initially, the Greek government spends a large 
quantity of money on social services, as it was previously mentioned, and it was due 
to an excess of it that they increased the internal crisis. After recognizing the crisis, 
the government was demanded to change the amount of money it spends as part of 
the programs to help Greece overcome the crisis. Another way GDP can influence the 
model is that through an analysis of the variable we can obtain the debt percentage of 
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GDP that can be sustained in the long term, with a specific interest rate and growth 
rate. This means that if there is no economic crisis Greece could raise their debt, and 
vice versa. Furthermore, a deeper analysis can reflect the time that Greece would 
need to be able to pay the external debt with the current economic situation.  
b. Greece Per Capita GDP – this variable uses the GDP and divides it by the number of 
people in the country. Therefore, it provides information on the relative performance 
of a country, an increase of its value means that there is economic growth as well as 
an increase in productivity, and vice versa (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2002). If the 
quantity of income of each individual decreases (Per Capita GDP) and the debt 
increases, the percentage of the public debt in comparison to its Per Capita GDP 
would be higher. This means that each person inside the country would acquire a 
higher cost of the external debt because government debts through loans or sovereign 
bonds are paid by the citizens, for example through an increase in taxes. In other 
words, the national debt is not a source of aggregated wealth because, in the end, it 
must be paid, which is done by means of taxation. It can be measured through a 
comparative analysis between Per Capita GDP and the amount of external debt of the 
Greek government.  
c. Level of regional integration within the Eurozone – “The concept of integration refers 
to a process in which units move from a condition of total or partial isolation towards 
a complete or partial unification. Applied to the interaction between independent 
sovereign states, integration refers to a process of large-scale territorial differentiation 
characterized by the progressive lowering of internal boundaries and the possible 
rising of new external boundaries” (De Lombaerde & Van Langenhove, 2005). 
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According to the European Commission the level of integration can be measured 
under the variables portrayed in the table below:  
Table 6: Parameters to measure the level of integration in the EU 
Categories	   Subcategories	   Variables	  
Trade	  liberalisation	  policy	   WTO	  Compatibility	  of	  rules	  of	  customs	  valuation	  
Quality	  of	  classification	  of	  goods	  
Application	  of	  rules	  of	  origin	  	  
Exemptions	  
Phasing	  out	  of	  temporary	  measures	  
Liberalization	  of	  trade	  in	  services	  
Importance	  of	  intra-­‐regional	  trade	  
	  
	  
Economic	  
integration	  
Other	  integration	  Policies	  	   Facilitation	  of	  investments	  
Movement	  of	  persons	  
Right	  of	  establishment	  
Competition	  policy	  
Creation	  and	  implementation	  of	  cohesion	  policy	  
Improvement	  of	  comparable	  statistics	  	  
Macroeconomic	  surveillance	  	  
Trade	  facilitation	  measures	  
Transport	   Progression	  towards	  a	  common	  transport	  policy	  
Expenditure	  for	  maintenance	  of	  regional	  	  network	  
Application	  of	  harmonized	  transit	  regulations	  
Functional	  
regional	  
cooperation	  
Maritime	  Resources	   Human	  and	  physical	  input	  for	  a	  common	  
surveillance	  
Human	  and	  physical	  input	  for	  a	  common	  
evaluation	  of	  natural	  resources	  
Enforcing	  of	  common	  quality	  and	  sanitary	  
standards	  	  
Institutions	  	   Number	  of	  meetings	  
Qualitative	  assessment	  of	  meetings	  
Performance	  of	  specific	  institutions	  	  
Budgets	   Fulfillment	  of	  requirements	  of	  budgetary	  
contributions	  	  
Transparency	  of	  procedures	  	  
Implementation	  of	  budgets	  
Governance,	  
Financial	  issues	  
and	  functioning	  of	  
institutions	  
HR	   Recruitment	  policy	  	  
Staff	  training	  	  
Progress	  on	  appraisal	  	   	  
Decisions	  	   	  
Implementation	  of	  
EDF	  projects	  and	  
programs	  	   Disbursements	   Contracts	  concluded	  
Contracts	  implemented	  
Source: European Commision (2002) 
Retrieved from: De Lombaerde & Van Langenhove, 2005 
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d. Financial needs of Greece – This refers to the quantity of money that Greece requires 
in order to maintain as part of the EMU and to not be insolvent. This variable can be 
measured through the deficit of the balance of payments. A deficit increase would 
increase the financial needs of Greece. Another way this variable can be measured is 
through the payment of the external debt of Greece: if a high percentage of the debt 
has not been paid, the financial needs of Greece would increase. Therefore, the 
demand of loans as well as the supply of sovereign bonds would augment.  
For this theory I am going to use econometric as well as statistical models. Both models 
are important because they provide the essential tools to estimate the parameters, proof 
hypothesis and predict the behavior of economic variables. One of the objectives of econometrics 
is to have a series of time variable in a country, so that its structural and dynamic analysis are 
able to use estimators to reliably predict future scenarios of short, medium and long term 
(“Applications of Econometrics,” 2012). Furthermore, it allows verifying if there is an inclusion 
of an irrelevant variable, or the exclusion of a relevant variable. For example, in the case of the 
antecedent variable we need to use regression models, such as ANOVA, which only works with 
variance and only involves qualitative variables, and ANCOVA, which works with covariance 
and includes qualitative as well as quantitative variables that can influence the 1 or 0 outcomes 
(“Dummy Variables,” 2012).  Statistical models are useful to estimate input parameters for the 
model proposed in this paper, it helps to develop a statistical prediction model through which 
future behavior can be estimated. Additionally, it helps estimate uncertainties in observational 
data as well as in calculations based on observational data, and to characterize numerical data to 
help one to concisely describe the measurements and to help in the development of conceptual 
models of a system of processes (“Why use mathematical,” 2012). All the characteristics of the 
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models mentioned above reveal the importance of using these in order to be able to apply and 
prove the theory proposed in this paper.  
 
Results 
 With the proper use and the right combination of data and methods described above, I 
plan to find the correlation between the amount of loan and the purchase of government bonds of 
the ECB, and the rating of sovereign debt of Greece by S&P. Also, I plan to find that there is no 
influence between the sovereign debt ratings of Greece by S&P and the amount of loans granted 
and bond buying of the ECB to Greece, in times of crisis. Today, decisions and actions taken by 
the ECB demonstrate that despite the low sovereign rate of Greece, the organization is willing to 
give loans and buy bonds in order to maintain the EMU intact. Also, the methods and data 
collected seek to prove that force and the way that S&P ratings change when there is an 
economic crisis in the region. That is, it seeks to test both hypotheses in order to prove that 
hypothesis one is incorrect due to the existence of the antecedent variable. Due to this, what we 
expect to find is that the lower the S&P rating, the higher the amount of loans and demand of 
sovereignty bonds of Greece by the ECB. That is, it satisfies the second hypothesis. All of which 
supports my theory.  
 
Conclusion  
 International Relations provide different theories from which the various events that take 
place in the international arena can be analyzed. Andrew Moravcsik, father of liberalism, has 
widely explained the inevitable influence of private groups in the international arena. This is the 
case of the ECB in relation to the rating agencies when there is no economic crisis. The decisions 
31	  
	  
regarding loan lending and sovereignty bonds purchasing, this is, in theory, prohibited for the 
ECB to do, have a direct relation: if a sovereign rate decreases, so does the amount of loans 
approved by the ECB and the amount of sovereign bonds bought through private companies. 
Does this apply in times of crisis? The information provided in the previous sections reveals that 
the scenario changes when there is an economic crisis within the Eurozone.     
This study provides information of one of the most important subjects in international 
political economics: the economic crisis in the Eurozone and the response of the ECB, but the 
problem does not end there. The influences of rating agencies, especially of S&P as it is the 
oldest and the most influential in the finance world, in the outcomes of the Eurozone crisis have 
been greatly questioned. S&P rates corporations, financial institutions, fund ratings, insurance, 
international public finance, public finance, sovereigns and structured finance. In general, a 
credit rating reflects the creditworthiness of a government, in the case of a sovereign rate. In 
other words, it reveals the capability of a government to pay loans and sovereign bonds. In order 
to state the rating, S&P executes a wide investigation in the different areas that can influence the 
creditworthiness of a government, for example institutional effectiveness and political risk. 
When S&P is in the process of downgrading or upgrading a rating it publishes it in Credit Watch, 
and this is a way of warning the governments so that they can respond to the public when the 
new rating is published.  
The ECB was created with the objective of managing the monetary policy of the member 
states of the EMU, all of which have agreed to follow the ECB’s dispositions. Therefore, 
countries under its mandate cannot print coins without previous approval of the ECB. The 
economic crisis in the Eurozone started in 2005 but it became more evident in Greece in October 
2009 when George Papandreou uncovered the deficit in the balance of payment of Greece that 
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the previous government had. Although the ECB had already warned the public of financial 
instability, they took longer than expected to react to the Greek financial crisis which, 
consequently, generated a greater negative impact inside the country. S&P had already warned 
the downgrade of Greece, this meant that numerous investors would retire their investments in 
that country which, consequently, aggravated the situation. Despite this, the ECB kept on giving 
financial support to the Greeks.   
This model includes three main variables. The independent variable is the ECB loan 
granting and sovereign bond purchasing. It is independent because, regardless of the S&P 
sovereign rate of Greece, the ECB would always support its member states. The dependent 
variable is the sovereign debt rate of S&P. It depends on the five aspects that S&P evaluates 
when rating a government. The antecedent variable is the economic crisis within the Eurozone. 
This means that the presence of this variable influences the way the ECB uses and applies S&P 
sovereign rate. Finally, it is important to consider various control variables that can influence the 
model. Four control variables are included in this model; this does not mean that they are the 
only ones. The first one is Greece GDP, which measures the final goods and services produced in 
one year, and it can affect this model since an increase in the GDP would mean that there is a 
better economic situation and, therefore, the S&P sovereign ratings would influence the 
decisions and actions of the ECB. The second one is Greece Per Capita GDP, which is the 
country’s GDP divided by the total number of people in Greece. This variable has the same 
impact in the model as the GDP. The third variable is the level of regional integration within the 
Eurozone. Also, it helps to understand the amount of money that the population would have to 
pay through taxation, due to an increase of the external debt. This means that the higher the level 
of regional integration, the less influence that S&P would have in the decisions of the ECB when 
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there is an EMU member state involved, like in the case of Greece. Finally, the financial needs of 
Greece also impact this model. Greece’s economic crisis was caused by the deficit in the balance 
of payments as well as the incapability of paying the external debt.  
 All the information helps to have different conclusions. First, when there is an economic 
crisis within an integrated region, the amount of loans granted and the amount of sovereignty 
bonds respond more to political than to economic motifs. This means that the decisions of the 
ECB do not respond to the S&P sovereign rates. In theory, “when a government uses monetary 
policy to deal with a balance-of-payment deficit, its central bank limits public access to funds for 
spending purposes and makes such funds more example” (Cohn, 2002). In other words, for the 
EMU member states and the ECB there are greater costs in letting the region dissolve than in 
increasing the loan granted to Greece and the purchase of government bonds. Even the President 
of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker, revealed this in one of his statements by establishing 
that, “the Eurogroup reiterates the importance of a further strengthening of Greece’s institutional 
capacity” (Juncker, 2012).  
On the other hand, when there is no economic crisis in an integrated region, the loans and 
the amount of sovereignty bonds bought do respond to an economic more than politic motif. 
Therefore, S&P does matter and influence the ECB decisions. Based on this, it is evident that in 
the case of Greece, due to a high regional integration and the presence of an economic crisis 
within the Eurozone, the ECB has responded more from a political perspective. Even though 
Greece has a SD rating, which means that it has the worst possible rate, the ECB has increased 
its loans to Greece and has even broke its internal law by buying sovereign loans, even if they 
justify it by stating that they do it through private companies. Furthermore, increasing the 
external debt of Greece only provides a temporary solution that has to be paid, sooner or later, by 
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the Greeks through taxes. In other words, higher debts are not a source of aggregated wealth 
because, at the end, they have to pay it by an increase of taxes.  
 In order to obtain more specific results there is the need of applying the methods 
previously described as well as studying more control variables that could influence the model. It 
is also useful to develop further studies regarding specific values of the amount of loans and 
sovereignty bonds purchased by the ECB. Today, due to the sensibility of the subject, the ECB 
does not have a detailed section describing the exact amounts of loans and sovereignty debt 
bought from Greece.  
 This model is a clear example of how the influence of private non-state actors in the 
international arena can change when other variables are present. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
the influence from S&P in the financial arena as well as in the international system maintains 
constant over a period of time. Consequently, the proposal of Moravcsik can be questioned under 
the circumstances previously described.  The international system, in the economic, politic and 
social arenas, is constantly changing. Due to this, it is important to analyze the different 
situations under different scopes.  
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